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1 
Food Trucks, Incremental Innovation, and 
Regulatory Ruts 
Beth Kregor† 
INTRODUCTION 
In this Essay, I will detail an innovation that gave new rele-
vance and economic success to old, battered food trucks. I will 
describe the regulatory context that made the innovation viable 
and then describe the various regulatory contexts around the 
country that challenged the spread of the innovation. Finally, I 
will analyze the particular problems faced by food-truck opera-
tors when trying to push the law to adapt to their incremental 
innovations. In recounting this history, I hope to demonstrate 
how intensive regulation that codifies an industry’s past can 
pose a significant barrier to incremental innovators who are try-
ing to improve on entrenched, traditional businesses. 
I.  THE INNOVATION 
The story of Roy Choi is undeniably the origin story of the 
modern food-truck movement—or, put less grandiosely, the 
modern food-truck moment. Like many a good legend, it includes 
a domineering mother, vice, loss, inspiration, teamwork, and, 
eventually, triumph based on all the lessons learned during the 
previous trials.1 
Choi is the son of Korean immigrants. He grew up helping 
his mother sell stinky kimchi out of the trunk of their car to sur-
vive in Los Angeles. He was ashamed of his mother, their pov-
erty, and the smells emanating from the family car when he was 
a child. Starting at age thirteen, he followed a trail of addictions, 
 
 † Lecturer in Law and Director of the Institute for Justice Clinic on  
Entrepreneurship, The University of Chicago Law School. 
 1 Like many a good legend, this story is also oversimplified. The idea and execu-
tion of the business model that made Choi a legend were the product of a team of people 
who brought various talents and experiences to the project. See Jessica Gelt, Kogi  
Korean BBQ, A Street Sensation Is Born, LA Times F1 (Feb 11, 2009). While this is a 
classic start-up story, that recounting does not resonate as an origin story in quite the 
same way as that of the solitary, inspired founder.  
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from marijuana to alcohol to gambling. Gambling was the worst, 
but it funded his introduction to fine restaurants and artful cui-
sine. He attended the Culinary Institute of America, graduated 
as valedictorian of his class, and went on to work as a chef. But 
eventually he found himself unemployed and running out of 
money. With little to lose, he accepted a friend’s dare to fill a ta-
co with Korean barbecued beef and sell it to late-night partiers 
outside clubs in Los Angeles. He circled back to his mother’s 
business model and sold the tacos out of an old taco truck, which 
he called Kogi. Quickly, he was heralded by Food & Wine as a 
Best New Chef and started an empire.2 He also inspired a  
nationwide trend. 
The innovation behind Kogi was not related to the truck it-
self. Taco trucks, or loncheras, have long been fixtures of Los 
Angeles’s economy and culture. Nor was Kogi’s food the grass-
roots innovation that changed the industry; as outstanding and 
creative as it was, other chefs had offered Korean tacos before,3 
and other food trucks had attracted the admiration of foodies 
and gourmands. The innovation of Kogi was the use of Twitter 
(just two years old at the time) to communicate with customers.4 
It was an incremental innovation that did not create an industry 
but rather changed and expanded it. 
Before Kogi, food trucks had three options to build a stable 
business: (1) establish a stable location to build a reputation 
with a limited, hyperlocal customer base; (2) sell predictable 
food from a generic menu to attract people wanting fast, cheap, 
ordinary food, regardless of the individual truck’s reputation; or 
(3) sell from locations of such convenience that they were cus-
tomers’ only viable option, like the trucks that parked outside 
construction sites to feed the workers. But Twitter allowed Kogi 
to build a customer base across Los Angeles. The unpredictable 
appearances of Kogi in any given location made its arrival a spe-
cial event. Followers stalked Kogi on Twitter, rushing out of of-
fice buildings and bars and dorms so that they could experience 
the phenomenon. Twitter had replicated and amplified the old 
 
 2 See generally Roy Choi, Natasha Phan, and Tien Nguyen, L.A. Son: My Life, My 
City, My Food (Ecco 2013). 
 3 See, for example, S. Irene Virbia, New Kids on the Block, LA Times Magazine 29 
(Sept 1, 1996). 
 4 See Ben Bergman, Tweeting Food Truck Draws LA’s Hungry Crowds (NPR Mar 
23, 2009), online at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=101881984 
(visited Jan 9, 2015); Gelt, A Street Sensation Is Born (cited in note 1); Andrew Romano, 
Now 4 Restaurant 2.0, Newsweek 55 (Feb 27, 2009).  
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ice-cream truck’s siren call: instead of playing “Pop Goes the 
Weasel” to draw people within hearing distance on a given block, 
Twitter simply flashed a message of “here we are” to alert thou-
sands of people in walking, biking, or driving distance. Along 
with other technological innovations, like GPS tracking and 
Square,5 Twitter made mobile food truly mobile, appealing to the 
upwardly mobile.6 
The innovation attributed to Kogi was not radical; it did not 
create a new industry, but it was an inspired incremental inno-
vation that changed an industry. Food trucks’ use of social me-
dia allowed them to be more efficient and reach more and  
different customers. 
II.  THE INNOVATION INCUBATOR  
Los Angeles provided fertile soil for the Kogi innovation to 
take root and spread, because some of the regulatory weeds had 
already been cleared away. For decades before Kogi matched 
Mexican taco shells with Korean barbecue and taco trucks with 
a high-tech marketing strategy, food trucks had been fighting 
regulatory restrictions in Los Angeles County. The tension was 
still high at the time that Kogi launched, but consistent prece-
dents protecting food trucks’ economic rights to operate in Los 
Angeles had already been set. A fleet of working food trucks was 
already in circulation, and the infrastructure required to clean 
and stock them was already in place. 
Los Angeles has a history of permitting and patronizing food 
trucks. Many are operated by Latinos and serve traditional Mex-
ican dishes—hence the shorthand “taco trucks” or loncheras. 
Food trucks contribute significantly to the economy of the city, 
as well as to its food culture and widespread access to affordable 
food.7 From at least the 1970s, food-truck operators invested in 
constructing trucks that served as kitchens on wheels, and they 
paid fees to commissaries where the trucks were cleaned, 
stocked, and stored.8 
 
 5 Square is a payment service that allows credit cards to be processed with a  
mobile phone. 
 6 See Jonathan Gold, Moveable Feasts: Tracing America’s Food Truck Revolution 
Back to Its L.A. Roots, Smithsonian Magazine 18–19 (Mar 2012). 
 7 See Jesús Hermosillo, Loncheras: A Look at the Stationary Food Trucks of Los 
Angeles *6 (UCLA School of Urban Planning Sept 2012), online at 
http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/labor/publications/reports/Locheras.pdf (visited Dec 22, 2014) 
(estimating that licensed food trucks in Los Angeles spent over $75 million in 2009). 
 8 See id at *6, 18. 
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Los Angeles also has a history of attempting to regulate food 
trucks out of business—attempts that have often been chal-
lenged and thwarted in court. In 1979, a California appellate 
court struck down a law that prohibited food trucks from park-
ing within one hundred feet of the street entrance to a restau-
rant, reasoning that the law did not make sense as a way to pre-
vent traffic congestion or ensure access to food when restaurants 
are not available.9 The court concluded that the law was instead 
a naked restraint of trade and therefore held that the restriction 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment.10 
In Barajas v City of Anaheim,11 another judge held that the 
California Vehicle Code preempted a city ordinance that banned 
sales from vehicles on the street.12 The Vehicle Code had provid-
ed that local ordinances could prohibit vending from a vehicle on 
a street when it was enacted in 1984, but that provision was 
eliminated by amendment in 1985.13 The court held that the 
amendment withdrew municipalities’ authority to prohibit vend-
ing altogether, leaving only the authority to regulate vending for 
purposes of public safety.14 In 2008, just in time for Kogi, the 
Vehicle Code was amended again, specifying that municipalities 
may pass “requirements for the public safety regulating the type 
of vending and the time, place, and manner of vending from ve-
hicles upon any street.”15 
The City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County were 
cracking down on taco trucks in 2008 and 2009, around the time 
that Kogi launched. Both governments passed laws requiring 
trucks to move every thirty minutes when in a residential area 
and every sixty minutes when in a commercial area, as well as 
wait three hours before returning to a given spot.16 The county’s 
law was passed in response to complaints of brick-and-mortar 
restaurants in unincorporated East Los Angeles, which blamed 
their financial troubles in part on taco trucks.17 Both laws were 
an attack on the business model of traditional taco trucks, which 
 
 9 See People v Ala Carte Catering Co, 98 Cal App 3d Supp 1, 9 (1979). 
 10 Id at 8–9. 
 11 15 Cal App 4th 1808 (1993). 
 12 Id at 1818. 
 13 Id at 1815. 
 14 Id at 1814–18 (discussing Cal Veh Code § 22455(b)). 
 15 Cal Veh Code § 22455(b). 
 16 See Ernesto Hernández-López, LA’s Taco Truck War: How Law Cooks Food Cul-
ture Contests, 43 U Miami Int-Am L Rev 233, 249 (2011). 
 17 See Garrett Therolf, Taco Trucks Can Stay Parked, LA Times B1 (Aug 28, 2008). 
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typically remain in one spot all day.18 The laws’ time limits made 
it virtually impossible to set up a cooking operation, prepare and 
serve food, cool down, and secure the kitchen for motion. These 
laws were viewed as an ambush on the area’s fourteen thousand 
licensed food trucks, many of which were owned by Latinos in 
East Los Angeles.19 Food-truck fans and operators organized to 
challenge the laws. Customers signed an online petition at 
Saveourtacotrucks.org, and truck owners sued.20 
In two cases, the Superior Court of the State of California 
for the County of Los Angeles struck down city and county time 
limits affecting food trucks.21 The provisions in the County Code 
were held to be so vague that citizens would not be able to un-
derstand or confidently follow them.22 The thirty- and sixty-
minute time limits were deemed arbitrary as related to public 
safety—the only purpose allowed for vending regulations—and 
wholly lacking a rational basis as required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.23 In the case challenging the 
city code, the University of California at Los Angeles Criminal 
Defense Clinic represented a food-truck operator who was being 
ticketed and fined up to one thousand dollars a day.24 The Supe-
rior Court held that the local authority could not place time lim-
its on vendors because the limits, again, had no rational relation 
to public safety.25 
Due to the history of loncheras in Los Angeles, it was possi-
ble for other local entrepreneurs to build quickly on Kogi’s inno-
vation and start their own trucks, serving delicious, creative 
dishes to foodies all over the city. Health laws were in place and 
inspectors knew what to do. There were approved trucks and 
commissaries available for use; in fact, plenty of trucks were 
 
 18 See Hermosillo, Loncheras at *11 (cited in note 7); Gold, Moveable Feasts at 19 
(cited in note 6). 
 19 See Rebecca Winters Keegan, The Great Taco Truck War, Time (Apr 25, 2008), 
online at http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1735104,00.html (visited Jan 
9, 2015); Hermosillo, Loncheras at *6 (cited in note 6). 
 20 See generally Therolf, Taco Trucks Can Stay Parked (cited in note 17); Keegan, 
The Great Taco Truck War (cited in note 19). 
 21 Order Following Demurrer Hearing, People v Garcia, Case No 8EA05884, *7 (Cal 
Sup filed Aug 27, 2008) (“Garcia Order”). 
 22 Id at *2–3. 
 23 Id at *2–5. 
 24 See Hernández-López, LA’s Taco Truck War at 253–54, citing Complaint,  
Gonzalez v City of Los Angeles Department of Transportation, No 09K08485 (LA Sup 
filed June 8, 2009) (cited in note 16). 
 25 See id. 
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available due to the timing of the innovation. The recession had 
hit, causing construction to slow dramatically. Trucks that had 
previously catered to construction workers were abundantly 
available to be repurposed into gourmet trucks, the owners of 
which could use Twitter to reach disparate customers.26 The Cal-
ifornia Vehicle Code and an engaged judiciary dampened at-
tempts by cities to prohibit or disable food trucks. The trend 
grew fast.27 
Innovative food-truck operators faced early challenges. In 
spite of court rulings, laws on the books in some municipalities 
still prohibited or severely restricted food-truck activity.28 Even 
where adverse laws had been removed, the police could respond 
to restaurants’ complaints and effectively ban trucks from cer-
tain streets through intensive enforcement of the facially neu-
tral parking laws or even baseless orders to leave.29 But Twitter 
made the new food trucks resilient to such challenges in a way 
that the loncheras had not been. If the police order a new truck 
to move, it can inform potential customers of its new location, 
and the customers can even suggest new available locations.30 In 
spite of some resistance, Los Angeles became the locus of a 
grassroots industry change begun by an innovation that reimag-
ined food trucks. 
 
 26 See Baylen Linnekin, Jeffrey Dermer, and Matthew Geller, The New Food Truck 
Advocacy: Social Media, Mobile Food Vending Associations, Truck Lots, & Litigation in 
California & Beyond, 17 Nexus: Chapman J L & Pol 35, 43–44 (2012). The timing of the 
innovation is also relevant because it occurred during the Great Recession. It is clear 
that the recession caused some people to lose their jobs and lose faith in big employers, 
and these people were drawn to the new food trucks’ promise of the American dream. 
The prospect of financing an experimental brick-and-mortar restaurant was also out of 
reach for many. 
 27 See Sharon Bernstein, Made in California; The Folks Who Build the Fancy Food 
Trucks, LA Times B1 (May 8, 2011). 
 28 See Linnekin, Dermer, and Geller, 17 Nexus: Chapman J L & Pol at 44 (cited in 
note 26).  
 29 See Ann M. Simmons, Mobile Food Vendors Told to Leave Miracle Mile, LA 
Times A7 (Aug 24, 2009). 
 30 See Gelt, A Street Sensation is Born (cited in note 1) (noting that, when “[some-
one asks] the Kogi truck to park elsewhere . . . legions of Kogi-lytes rally to find a desira-
ble new location”). 
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III.  HOSTILE LEGAL ENVIRONMENTS FOR INCREMENTAL 
INNOVATORS 
The new generation of food trucks was not an entirely new 
business category, completely unanticipated by or absent from 
local regulations. They were not delivering food by drones.31 Ra-
ther, the entrepreneurs who sought to model new businesses on 
the trendy and successful Los Angeles food trucks encountered a 
wide variety of preexisting legal regimes governing mobile food. 
As incremental innovators, they had to either comply with or 
change the laws on the books, which had been written for food 
trucks following a different business model. To change the law, 
these innovators had to counter resistance from both govern-
ments and established, entrenched businesses.  
When the reimagined business model for food trucks started 
to spread, many cities and towns already had laws covering food 
trucks as they were conceptualized at the time that the laws 
were written. Though some of those laws were fairly flexible 
(Austin, Texas),32 other laws were rigid, designed specifically for 
ice-cream trucks (Santa Cruz, California)33 or trucks selling pre-
packaged food (Chicago, Illinois).34 Cities like Charlotte, North 
Carolina, expected and thus required vendors to stay in one 
place each day, not even allowing them to be on the public street 
or close to a residential area.35 New York City capped mobile-
food licenses in 1985, meaning that an inspired entrepreneur 
would be placed on a long wait-list or forced to buy a permit on 
the black market.36 
A highly specified regulatory scheme designed exclusively 
for traditional food trucks can impede or completely shut out the 
new trucks. For example, the mobile-food laws in Santa Cruz, 
California, have not been updated since 2005. They allow trucks 
 
 31 For examples of this technology, see Alison Spiegel, These Are All the Foods You 
Can Get Delivered by Drones (The Huffington Post June 9, 2014), online at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/09/food-delivery-drone_n_5461689.html (visited 
Jan 9, 2015). 
 32 Austin Code §§ 10-3-1, 10-3-91, 10-3-95. 
 33 Santa Cruz Muni Code § 5.22.110(a). 
 34 See generally Kate MacArthur, Meals on Wheels, for Real, 34 Crain’s Chicago 
Bus 21 (May 2011); Mike Sula, Food Truck Roadblock (Chicago Reader Apr 29, 2010), 
online at http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/chicago-street-food-trucks-philip-foss-
troy-marcus-johnson-matt-maroni/Content?oid=1733152 (visited Jan 31, 2015). 
 35 Charlotte Muni Code § 12.510. 
 36 NYC Admin Code § 17-307. 
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to sell prepared food only, and in residential and industrial are-
as only. The trucks must move at least one block every fifteen 
minutes.37 (Note that these laws persist even as courts in other 
counties have invalidated similar regulations on state law and 
constitutional grounds.)38 The Santa Cruz laws work for ice-
cream trucks making quick stops to sell ready-to-eat ice-cream 
bars on each block of a residential neighborhood, but they are 
problematic for new gourmet trucks aiming to prepare and serve 
fresh lunches to office workers. A truck like Low N Slow in San-
ta Cruz can operate only two and a half hours a day, three days 
a week, on private property, and its ability to succeed is there-
fore severely limited.39 
The food trucks’ regulatory plight illustrates a much broad-
er pattern: incremental innovators often face great regulatory 
risk. They are thinking outside the box and dealing with laws 
codifying that box. When the government has created stringent, 
obligatory standards for a product or service as it exists at time 
one, the unexpected innovation at time two may push the new 
product or service out of compliance, even if it improves on 
standard practice. The innovators face delay and possible denial 
when seeking approval from authorities regulating the improved 
product.40 Under these circumstances, the innovators may not 
bother making the improvement at all. (We can never know 
what innovations were cast aside or never pursued because get-
ting them approved by check-the-box regulators was too diffi-
cult.)41 
Incremental innovation in service industries is particularly 
burdened because service businesses are heavily regulated by 
local governments, and this regulation has increased significant-
ly in recent decades.42 Service-industry innovators,  
 
 37 Santa Cruz Muni Code § 5.22.110(a). See also J.M. Brown, Food Truck Freedom: 
Santa Cruz to Revise Mobile Vending Rules, Santa Cruz Sentinel News (July 12, 2014), 
online at http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/general-news/20140712/food-truck-freedom-
santa-cruz-to-revise-mobile-vending-rules (visited Jan 9, 2015). 
 38 See notes 21–25 and accompanying text. 
 39 See J.M. Brown, Food Truck Freedom (cited in note 37). 
 40 See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A 
Conceptual Framework, 69 Cal Law Rev 1256, 1294 (1981). 
 41 See id. 
 42 See generally Dick M. Carpenter II, et al, License to Work: A National Study of 
Burdens from Occupational Licensing (The Institute for Justice May 2012), online at 
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/licensetowo
rk.pdf (visited Jan 9, 2015); Morris M. Kleiner and Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the  
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especially those wanting to launch a national business, face 
myriad inconsistent and overly specific regulations that resem-
ble the heads of Hydra. 
Contemporary examples of incremental innovators that face 
ill-suited or hostile regulations abound, as entrepreneurs use the 
Internet to innovate in traditional service industries. Uber and 
Airbnb are prominent examples. But the problem is not limited 
to Internet start-ups. For an analog analogue, consider Verlin 
Stoll. He had simplified the business model for his funeral home 
so that he could offer services at 10 percent of the average fee. 
He wanted to open a second location without spending thirty 
thousand dollars on a second embalming room, but Minnesota 
law required any business licensed as a funeral home to have its 
own embalming room.43 Like the California courts confronting 
food-truck time limits and requirements that trucks remain a 
specific distance from restaurants, a court struck down the law 
as an irrational deprivation of due process.44 But there are many 
more entrepreneurs and many more outdated, unnecessary laws 
than judgments striking economic regulations down.45 
The more detailed and specified regulations are, the greater 
the challenge for any incremental innovators. If laws codify eve-
ry detail of the business model that is prevalent when they are 
written, they set future innovators up for noncompliance. For 
example, in the heavily regulated funeral industry, some states 
require every service traditionally offered by funeral homes to be 
provided by licensed traditional funeral homes,  
 
Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market, 31 J Labor Econ 
S173 (2013). 
 43 Stoll v Minnesota Department of Health, 2013 WL 7204912, *3, 9 (Ramsey Coun-
ty D Minn). 
 44 Id at *18. 
 45 Economic regulations are almost impossible to challenge on constitutional 
grounds because courts apply the rational-basis test. If the court can imagine a govern-
mental purpose for the law, and the law bears any weak connection to that imagined 
purpose, then the court may let the law stand. See Williamson v Lee Optical Co, 348 US 
483, 487–88 (1955). The plaintiff challenging an economic regulation must prove a nega-
tive: that there is no conceivable relation between the law and a legitimate purpose. Oc-
casionally, engaged judges look closely at economic regulations and strike down laws 
that appear to be pursuing illegitimate purposes, like naked restraints of trade. See gen-
erally, for example, St. Joseph Abbey v Castille, 712 F3d 215 (5th Cir 2013); Craigmiles v 
Giles, 312 F3d 220 (6th Cir 2002). However, victories are rare for plaintiffs in rational-
basis cases. See Michael J. Phillips, The Slow Return of Economic Substantive Due  
Process, 49 Syracuse L Rev 917, 941–42 (1999); Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational 
Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term through Romer v Evans, 32 Ind 
L Rev 357, 357 (1999). 
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under the supervision of a licensed funeral director who has 
learned the skills of embalming, counseling, and more. These 
laws make it illegal for a business to sell discount caskets online 
or out of a monastery’s woodshop.46 Similarly, laws that lay out 
every detail for operating a cosmetology school—down to specify-
ing mandatory curriculum covering hair coloring, facials, and 
manicures, as well as mandatory equipment such as shampoo 
bowls, facial chairs, and manicure tables—make it illegal for a 
business to specialize in teaching makeup application or teach 
online.47 
In the food-truck context, cities and towns like Santa Cruz 
that passed laws pre-Kogi, specifying exactly where, when, and 
how food trucks may operate, made entry and growth very diffi-
cult for the new trucks using social media. In contrast, cities and 
towns that had minimal regulations in place requiring safe food 
handling and traffic-safety compliance were poised to welcome 
food trucks and experience the job growth and cultural richness 
that come with them.48 
IV.  OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO REGULATORY ADAPTATION 
In order to thrive like they have in Los Angeles, new-wave 
food trucks need to push for amendment of the outdated and ex-
cessively restrictive laws that they face. They need to knock 
down short time limits on parking, proximity restrictions that 
ban them from commercial districts or business strips, and con-
straints on the food that they serve. Some may succeed, as the 
loncheras did, by bringing lawsuits challenging the validity of 
local regulations.49 However, litigation is slow and costly. Most 
 
 46 See, for example, Okla Stat § 59-396.3a; Va Code § 54.1-2800 et seq. Compare 
Craigmiles, 312 F3d at 222; St. Joseph Abbey, 712 F3d at 227 (holding that the regula-
tion had no rational relationship to any legitimate purpose and thus violated the  
Fourteenth Amendment), with Powers v Harris, 379 F3d 1208, 1225 (10th Cir 2004) 
(holding that protectionism is a legitimate purpose for imposing restrictions on casket 
sales). 
 47 See, for example, Nev Rev Stat §§ 644.020–.510. 
 48 See Crystal T. Williams, A Hungry Industry on Rolling Regulations: A Look at 
Food Truck Regulations in Cities across the United States, 65 Me L Rev 705, 711–12 
(2013) (describing how the light regulation of food trucks in Indianapolis made the small 
city a top growth spot in the industry). 
 49 Chicago food trucks have sued the city, challenging the constitutionality of the 
rules prohibiting them from parking within two hundred feet of a restaurant and requir-
ing that they have GPS constantly broadcasting their locations on the Internet. See gen-
erally Complaint, Burke v Chicago, No 12-CH-41235 (Cook County Cir filed Nov 14, 
2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 5513206).  
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food-truck operators must try to convince lawmakers in city and 
town halls to ease the restrictions that make it hard for food 
trucks to succeed. 
In spite of the popularity of food trucks, which are now fea-
tured as American dream vignettes in a reality show and popu-
lar movies, reform efforts are challenging indeed. In Chicago, for 
example, the first wave of so-called gourmet food trucks faced 
extremely restrictive regulations. They were not allowed to pre-
pare food on board, stop for more than two hours at a time, serve 
during the early morning or late night when restaurants were 
closed, or park within two hundred feet of a restaurant.50 The 
parking restrictions were not heavily enforced at first, but they 
were on the books. And violations that were obvious or suggest-
ed during the inspection process meant that a truck would not 
get licensed at all.51 
Led by one of the first of the new truck owners, Matt Maro-
ni, Chicago food-truck operators advocated for years to change 
these laws. They circulated petitions and started online cam-
paigns. They met with sympathetic aldermen and the staff of 
the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection.52 
The mayor’s office proposed new food-truck laws in 2012, 
stating that the city was welcoming the new wave of food trucks 
and catching up with other cities, while also protecting restau-
rants.53 The proposed laws created a new license for food trucks 
that cook on board, maintained the two-hundred-foot buffer zone 
around restaurants and the two-hour time limit on parking, 
 
 50 See generally Sula, Food Truck Roadblock (cited in note 34). 
 51 Big Star, a popular restaurant, failed the inspection to license its food truck be-
cause it had a cutting board built into the truck. See Monica Eng, Big Star Food Truck 
Ready to Roll Despite Breaking City Rules (Chicago Tribune Oct 6, 2011), online at 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-06/news/chi-food-trucks-big-star-truck-ready-
to-roll-20111006_1_matt-maroni-taco-truck-taqueros (visited Jan 9, 2015); David 
Tamarkin, Big Star’s Food Truck Failed Inspection. Will It Go Rogue? (Time Out Chicago 
Oct 6, 2011), online at http://www.timeout.com/chicago/food-drink/big-stars-food-truck-
failed-inspection-will-it-go-rogue (visited Jan 9, 2015). 
 52 See Monica Eng, Food Trucks, Other Outfits Savor New Morsels of Hope, Chicago 
Tribune 6 (Sept 28, 2011). See also Nick Kindelsperger, Food Truck Crossroads: What’s 
Next after Matt Moroni’s Gaztro-Wago Goes on Hiatus (Serious Eats Jan 5, 2012), online 
at http://chicago.seriouseats.com/2012/01/food-truck-bummer-gaztro-wagon-on-
hiatus.html (visited Jan 9, 2015). 
 53 See City of Chicago, Press Release, Mayor Emanuel to Legalize Cook-on-Site 
Food Truck Industry across Chicago (June 26, 2012), online at 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2012/june_2
012/mayor_emanuel_tolegalizecook-on-sitefoodtruckindustryacrosschica.html (visited 
Jan 30, 2015). 
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committed to demarcating parking spots for food trucks in 
neighborhoods with lots of restaurants, quadrupled the fines for 
violations of parking rules (compared to violations of health or 
sanitation rules), and required trucks to install extremely accu-
rate GPS devices that broadcast their locations to the public 
whenever the trucks were turned on. The public hearing about 
the proposal began with testimony from the local restaurant as-
sociation, which had consulted on the new law and agreed with 
most of it. By the time that food-truck owners testified passion-
ately in opposition to the proposed law, much of the committee 
had left the room. A runner had to bring people back to make 
quorum at the end of the hearing, when the committee voted in 
favor of the proposal without amendments.54 
In Chicago, the regulations were adapted, but they were not 
made more general or capable of accommodating future innova-
tions. The time and place regulations were tightened, with 
stricter fines and requirements for technological monitoring. The 
voices of food-truck owners were drowned out by the voices of 
restaurateurs. 
In Washington, DC, regulatory adaptation followed a differ-
ent arc. The city’s initial response in 2010 to the upsurge in food 
trucks was to propose a moratorium. However, it withdrew that 
proposal when the DC Food Truck Association sparked a social 
media campaign that generated over two thousand comments in 
favor of food trucks when the moratorium was posted for public 
comment.55 The laws that eventually passed in 2013 were favor-
able to food trucks, though imperfect. The president of the DC 
Food Truck Association remarked that they were some of the 
best laws in the country “because they preserve the industry’s 
central tenet—roaming.”56 Twitter gave Kogi the freedom to be 
truly mobile, and modern food trucks succeed if their owners 
convince legislators to let them sell throughout a city. 
 
 54 I participated in these events as an advocate for the food trucks and freedom of 
entrepreneurship, so these facts are recounted from memory. See also Chicago Food 
Truck Ordinance Approved by City Council Committee (Huffington Post July 20, 2012), 
online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/20/chicago-food-truck-
ordina_n_1688963.html (visited Jan 9, 2015). 
 55 See Linnekin, Dermer, and Geller, 17 Nexus: Chapman J L & Pol at 47 (cited in 
note 26). See also Vicky Gan, Cities Can’t Ignore That Food Trucks Have Grown Up 
(Next City Equity Factor Aug 25, 2014), online at http://nextcity.org/daily/entry/food-
trucks-laws-zoning-regulations-dc-philadelphia-new-york-los-angeles (visited Jan 9, 
2015). 
 56 Gan, Cities Can’t Ignore That Food Trucks Have Grown Up (cited in note 55). 
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Yet food trucks face serious challenges in campaigning for 
favorable regulatory adaptation. Not only are their owners try-
ing to change the policies made by zoning, streets and sanita-
tion, health, and business departments in local governments of 
various sizes and levels of professionalism, but they are also try-
ing to overcome the voices of restaurateurs and restaurant asso-
ciations—classic examples of powerful, entrenched interests.  
Licensing laws are often determined by the size, strength, and 
budget of trade associations rather than the public’s need for 
protection.57 Restaurants have established connections to local 
lawmakers, and their concerns about destructive competition 
from food trucks resonate.58 When existing restaurants claim to 
fear that they will have to close down or lay off workers, politi-
cians must decide whether to pass a law that would destroy 
something that already exists in order to open the door for some-
thing that might come in the future. That is a politically difficult 
vote.59 
The political challenges that food trucks face are almost 
predictable for incremental innovators. Just as incremental in-
novators face acute regulatory barriers to entry, they also face 
acute political barriers to entry. Whenever an incremental inno-
vator is shut out or handicapped by a law that has governed the 
conventional businesses in the industry, its efforts to change 
that law will likely meet resistance from the established busi-
nesses. Perhaps the established businesses invested resources in 
complying with those regulations and they do not think that it 
would be fair to excuse new entrants. Perhaps the conventional 
businesses were involved in writing the laws that codify the way 
that they conduct business. Perhaps they do not want competi-
tion from innovators once the innovators’ improvements are 
 
 57 See, for example, Lee Benham and Alexandra Benham, Regulating through the 
Professions: A Perspective on Information Control, 18 J L & Econ 421, 428–29 (1975). But 
see generally Marc T. Law and Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise of 
Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing Regulation (National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper No 10467, May 2004), online at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10467.pdf (visited Jan 9, 2015) 
 58 See Stewart, 69 Cal L Rev at 1285–86 (cited in note 40) (“Government policies 
explicitly aimed at achieving a regulatory version of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ 
will generate politically powerful opposition from affected firms, consumers, and  
employees.”). 
 59 See id at 1270 (“[I]mposing stringent controls on existing processes and products 
may disrupt the expectation interests of firms and consumers. . . . Imposing stringent 
controls on existing plants may lead to plant closings and job losses, which are far more 
politically controversial than a failure to build a new plant because of controls.”).  
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permitted. Regardless, the allied business owners can devote re-
sources to lobbying that overwhelm the voice of a single innova-
tor. The customers who stand to benefit from a future innovation 
if it is licensed rarely participate in the debate. 
Again, Uber and Airbnb are exemplary. The taxicab indus-
try resists laws that license ridesharing businesses, claiming 
that the long-established regulatory scheme that the conven-
tional taxi companies follow has cost them money and made 
them safe for riders.60 Hotels resist Airbnb with similar argu-
ments.61 There are also examples in the analog world. Cosmetol-
ogy associations lobby hard against proposed laws that would 
exempt natural braiding from cosmetology licensing require-
ments—including hundreds of hours of unrelated schooling—
claiming that unlicensed braiders would constitute unfair com-
petition and pose a risk to the public.62 
The new generation of food trucks has had some success in 
overcoming the political challenges inherent in incremental in-
novation. Even faced with heavy restrictions, they can build a 
following among their customers. Because they use social media 
to connect with those customers, they can rally the public to par-
ticipate in political debates, upending the usual public-choice 
paradigm. They have done so successfully in DC and other cit-
ies.63 A call to action with a tweet gives a supportive customer a 
means of getting somewhat politically involved immediately, ei-
ther by retweeting or signing a petition that automatically sends 
e-mails to legislators. Food trucks have a distinct advantage in 
this respect over their analog counterparts. Traditional sidewalk 
vendors, like loncheras, cannot mobilize their loyal customers so 
quickly and effortlessly. Campaigns to legalize sidewalk vendors 
in Los Angeles and Chicago have continued for years.64 
 
 60 See, for example, Odette Yousef, Cab, Livery Companies Sue City over Rideshare 
Companies WBEZ 91.5 (Chicago Public Media Feb 6, 2014), online at 
http://www.wbez.org/news/cab-livery-companies-sue-city-over-rideshare-companies-
109655 (visited Jan 9, 2015). 
 61 See, for example, Lisa Fickenscher, Hotels Girding for a Fight against Airbnb 
(Crains New York Business Aug 19, 2013), online at 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20130819/HOSPITALITY_TOURISM/130819909/
hotels-girding-for-a-fight-against-airbnb (visited Jan 9, 2015). 
 62 See generally Jacob Goldstein, So You Think You Can Be a Hair Braider?, NY 
Times Magazine 20 (June 12, 2012). 
 63 See Linnekin, Dermer, and Geller, 17 Nexus: Chapman J L & Pol at 46–47 (cited 
in note 26). 
 64 The campaign to legalize the occupation rather than loosen restrictions is a com-
plex one. The infrastructure does not exist for sidewalk vendors to comply with standard 
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In spite of the advantages of social media, food trucks face 
restrictive regulations in cities across the country. City and town 
councils have not adapted their regulations enough to realize the 
full economic benefits of Kogi’s innovation. Like many incremen-
tal innovators, food-truck operators struggle to overcome the po-
litical forces of entrenched business interests that have little in-
terest in opening the industry to creative new competitors. Only 
by marshaling popular support can small start-ups like food 
trucks hope to achieve the necessary regulatory reform.  
CONCLUSION 
Food trucks are a rapidly growing sector of the restaurant 
industry, thanks to the grassroots innovation that began with 
Kogi. As the reimagined business model has spread around the 
country, it has become possible to observe how entrepreneurs 
have fared in various regulatory regimes. In these hyperlocal la-
boratories of democracy, regulatory experiments play out. Where 
laws are limited to protecting health and safety, as in Los Ange-
les (by force of the courts), there is space for incremental innova-
tors to improve on existing business models. Where laws are ex-
tremely specific to the established business models or 
protectionist of them, innovation is thwarted. To rescue innova-
tion in a hostile legal environment, entrepreneurs must bring 
their customers into the debate. With numbers on their side, in-
cremental innovators may occasionally solve the acute public-
choice problem that they face. 
 
health regulations. Sidewalk vendors would need accessible, affordable community 
kitchens where they could rent space for short periods of time. Their campaigns may 
therefore need to reform the laws governing shared kitchens as well as sidewalk  
vending. 
